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Abstract. This paper describes the forensic and intelligence analysis
capabilities of the Email Mining Toolkit (EMT) under development at
the Columbia Intrusion Detection (IDS) Lab. EMT provides the means
of loading, parsing and analyzing email logs, including content, in a wide
range of formats. Many tools and techniques have been available from
the ﬁelds of Information Retrieval (IR) and Natural Language Processing
(NLP) for analyzing documents of various sorts, including emails. EMT,
however, extends these kinds of analyses with an entirely new set of
analyses that model ”user behavior”. EMT thus models the behavior
of individual user email accounts, or groups of accounts, including the
”social cliques” revealed by a user’s email behavior.
1 Introduction
This paper describes the forensic and intelligence analysis capabilities of the
Email Mining Toolkit (EMT) under development at the Columbia IDS Lab.
EMT provides the means of loading, parsing and analyzing email logs, includ-
ing content, in a wide range of formats. Many tools and techniques have been
available from the ﬁelds of IR and NLP for analyzing documents of various sorts,
including emails. EMT, however, extends these kinds of analyses with an entirely
new set of analyses that model ”user behavior”. EMT thus models the behavior
of individual user email accounts, or groups of accounts, including the ”social
cliques” revealed by a user’s email behavior. EMT’s design has been driven by
the core security application to detect virus propagations, spambot activity and
security policy violations. However, the technology also provides critical intel-
ligence gathering and forensic analysis capabilities for agencies to analyze dis-
parate Internet data sources for the detection of malicious users, attackers, and
other targets of interest. This dual use is graphically displayed in Figure ??. For
example, one target application for intelligence gathering supported by EMT is
the identiﬁcation of likely ”proxy email accounts”, email accounts that exhibit
similar behavior and thus may be used by a single person. Although EMT has
been designed speciﬁcally for email analysis, the principles of its operation are
equally relevant to other Internet audit sources.
This data mining technology previously reported [?,?,?], and graphically dis-
played in Figure ??, has been proven to automatically compute or create both
signature-based misuse detection and anomaly detection-based misuse discovery.
The application of this technology to diverse Internet objects and events (e.g.,
email and web transactions) allows for a broad range of behavior-based analyses
including the detection of proxy email accounts and groups of user accounts that
communicate with one another including covert group activities.
Data mining applies machine learning and statistical techniques to automat-
ically discover and detect misuse patterns, as well as anomalous activities in
general. When applied to network-based activities and user account observa-
tions for the detection of errant or misuse behavior, these methods are referred
to as behavior-based misuse detection.
Behavior-based misuse detection can provide important new assistance for
counter-terrorism intelligence. In addition to standard Internet misuse detec-
tion, these techniques will automatically detect certain patterns across user ac-
counts that are indicative of covert, malicious or counter-intelligence activities.
Moreover, behavior-based detection provides workbench functionalities to in-
teractively assist an intelligence agent with targeted investigations and oﬀ-line
forensics analyses.
Intelligence oﬃcers have a myriad of tasks and problems confronting them
each day. The sheer volume of source materials requires a means of honing in
on those sources of maximal value to their mission. A variety of techniques can
be applied drawing upon the research and technology developed in the ﬁeld
of Information Retrieval. There is, however, an additional source of information
available that can used to aid even the simplest task of rank ordering and sorting
documents for inspection: behavior models associated with the documents can be
used to identify and group sources in interesting new ways. This is demonstrated
by the Email Mining Toolkit that applies a variety of data mining techniques
for proﬁling and behavior modeling of email sources.
The deployment of behavior-based techniques for intelligence investigation
and tracking tasks represents a signiﬁcant qualitative step in the counter-intelligence
”arms race”. Because there is no way to predict what data mining will discover
over any given data set, ”counter-escalation” is particularly diﬃcult.
Behavior-based misuse detection is more robust against standard knowledge-
based techniques. Behavior-based detection has the capabilities to detect new
patterns (i.e., patterns that have not been previously observed), provide early
warning alerts to users and analysts, and automatically adapt to both normal and
misuse behavior. By applying statistical techniques over actual system and user
account behavior measurements, automatically-generated models and rules are
tuned to the particular source material. This process, in turn, avoids the human
bias that is intrinsic when misuse signatures, patterns and other knowledge-based
models are designed by hand, as is the norm.
Despite this, no general infrastructure has been developed for the systematic
application of behavior-based (misuse) detection across a broad set of detection
and intelligence analysis tasks such as fraudulent Internet activities, virus de-
tection, intrusion detection and user account proﬁling. Today’s Internet security
systems are specialized to apply a small range of techniques, usually knowledge-
based, to an individual misuse detection problem, such as intrusion, virus or
SPAM detection. Moreover, these systems are designed for one particular net-
work environment, such as medium-sized network enclaves, and only tap into
an individual cross-section of network activity such as email activity or TCP/IP
activity. Behavior-based detection technology as proposed herein will likely pro-
vide a quantum leap in security and in intelligence analysis in both oﬄine and
online task environments.
EMT has been described in another publication, focusing on its use for secu-
rity applications, including virus and spam detection, as well as security policy
violations. In this paper, we focus on several of its features speciﬁc to intelligence
applications, namely the means of clustering email by content based analyses,
identiﬁcation of ”similar email accounts” based upon measuring similarity be-
tween account proﬁles represented by histograms, and clique analyses that are
supported by EMT.
1.1 Applying Behavior-Based Detection to Email sources
Table ?? enumerates a range of behavior-based Internet applications. These ap-
plications cover a set of detection, security and marketing applications that exist
within the government, commercial and private sectors. Each of these applica-
tions are within the capabilities of behavior-based techniques by applying data
mining algorithms over appropriate audit data sources.
Our current research has applied behavior-based methods directly to the ﬁrst
six applications listed in Table ??: Fraud detection, malicious email detection,
intrusion detection, user community discovery, behavior pattern discovery, and
analyst workbench. Each of these are Internet security applications, applying to
both outbound and inbound network- and email-based traﬃc.
Solving Internet security problems greatly assists surveillance intelligence
activities. For example, the discovery of user account communities and the dis-
covery and detection of certain community behavior patterns can be directed to
uncover certain classes of covert, clandestine or espionage behavior performed
with Internet resources. Furthermore, fraud detection in particular has direct
beneﬁt for an intelligence agency by proﬁling and identifying users and clusters
of users that participate in such malicious Internet activities such as fraudulent
activities.
Behavior-based detection has been proven against similar, analogous security
applications. The ﬁnance, telecom and energy industries have protected their
customers from fraudulent misuse of their services (e.g., fraudulent misuse of
credit card accounts, telephone calling cards, stealing of utility service, etc.)
by modeling their individual customer accounts and detecting deviations from
this model for each of their customers. The behavior-based protection paradigm
applied to the Internet thus has an historical precedent that is now ubiquitous
and transparent as exempliﬁed by the credit card in the reader’s wallet or purse.
1.2 EMT as an Analyst Workbench for Interactive Intelligence
Investigations
The ”Malicious Email Tracking” (MET) [?] is an online system that uses email
ﬂow statistics to capture new virii, which are largely undetectable by the ”signa-
ture” detection methods of today’s state-of-the-art commercial virus detection
systems. Speciﬁcally, all email attachments are tracked by tracing a private hash
value, temporal statistics such as replication rate are recorded to trace the at-
tachments’ trajectory, e.g., across LANs, and these statistics directly inform
the detection of self-replicating, malicious software attachments. MET has been
developed and deployed as an extension to mail servers and is fully described
elsewhere. MET is an example of an online ”behavior-based” security system
that defends and protects a system not solely by attempting to identify known
attacks against a system, but rather by detecting deviations from a system’s
normal behavior. Many approaches to ”anomaly detection” have been proposed,
including research systems that aim to detect masqueraders by modeling user
behaviors in command line sequences, or even keystrokes. However, in this case,
MET is architected to protect user accounts by modeling user email ﬂows to
detect malicious email attachments, especially polymorphic viruses that are not
detectable or traceable via signature-based detection methods.
The ”Email Mining Toolkit” (EMT) on the other hand, is an oﬄine system
applied to email ﬁles gathered from server logs or client email programs. EMT
computes information about email ﬂows from and to email accounts, aggregate
statistical information from groups of accounts, and analyzes content ﬁelds of
emails. The EMT system provides temporal statistical feature computations
and behavior-based modeling techniques, through an interactive user interface
to enable targeted intelligence investigations and semi-manual forensic analysis
of email ﬁles. Figure ?? illustrates the general architecture of a behavior-based
system deploying dual functionality:
1. An online security detection application (in this case, MET for malicious
email detection)
2. A general analyst workbench for intelligence investigations (EMT, for email
source analysis)
As this ﬁgure illustrates, these functionalities share a great deal of overhead.
With regard to the implementation, by deploying these dual functionalities, the
audit module, computation of temporal statistics, user modeler and database of
user models each serve for both functionalities. Moreover, with regard to the con-
ceptual design, the particular set of temporal statistics and user model processes
designed for one can improve the performance of the other. In particular, tem-
poral features, as well as user account models and clusters, are representatively
general ”fundamental building blocks.” EMT provides the following functional-
ities, interactively:
– Querying a database (warehouse) of email data and computed feature values,
including:
• Ordering and sorting emails on the basis of content analysis (n-gram
analysis, keyword spotting, and classiﬁcations of email supported by an
integrated supervised learning feature using Nave Bayes classiﬁer trained
on user selected features)
• Historical features that proﬁle user groups by statistically measuring
behavior characteristics.
• User models that group users according to features such as typical email-
ing patterns (as represented by histograms over diﬀerent selectable statis-
tics), and email communities (including the ”social cliques” revealed in
email exchanges between email accounts.
– Applying statistical models to email data to alert on abnormal or unusual
email events.
Table 1. Behavior-Based Internet Applications for Security and Beyond
Application: Description and Variations: Examples: Audit Sources:
Fraud detection Unauthorized outgoing email Console usurped Email
Child attacks teacher
Unauthenticated email Deceptive source
Unauthorized transactions Purchase/credit fraud HTTP
Transaction services.
Malicious email detection Viruses Email
Worms
”SPAM”
Intrusion detection Network-based detection Standard IDS TCP/IP
Host-based detection Less standard IDS System logs
Application-based detection Future IDS App. logs
User community discovery Closely connected user-base Email ’circles’ Email
Behavior-pattern Account-based patterns Suspect activities All sources: Email, HTTP,
discovery Community-based patterns Transaction services, TCP/IP,
Telnet traffic, FTP traffic,
Clandestine activities cookiesEmail, FTP, Telnet
Analyst Workbench Interactive forensic analysis Targeted intelligence All sources
investigations
Account proxy detection Accounts used by same user Clandestine activities All sources
Collaborative filtering Website recommendations Pageview prediction HTTP
Purchase recommendations Music/movie choices Transaction services
Policy violation detection ISP or User espionage All sources Email
enclave security policies Outgoing SPAM
Web-bot detection Statistics/knowledge gathering Competitive analysis HTTP
Site maintenance Finding broken links
Search-engine spider Google, Altavista
EMT is also designed as a plug in to a data mining platform, originally de-
signed and implemented at Columbia called the DW/AMG architecture (Data
Warehouse/Adaptive Model Generation system). That work has been trans-
ferred to System Detection Inc (SysD http://www.sysd.com), a DARPA-spinout
from Columbia who has commercialized the system as the Hawkeye Security
Platform.
2 EMT Features
The full range of EMT features have been described elsewhere . For the present
paper, we provide a brief overview of several of its key features of direct rele-
vance to security analysis and intelligence applications, along with descriptive
screenshots of EMT in operation.
Fig. 1. User account proﬁling, dual use: online detection and oﬄine analysis.
2.1 Attachment models
MET was initially conceived to statistically model the behavior of email attach-
ments in real time ﬂowing through an enclave’s email server, and support the
coordinated sharing of information among a wide area of email servers to identify
malicious attachments and halt their propagation before saturation. In order to
properly share such information, each attachment must be uniquely identiﬁed,
which is accomplished through the computation of an MD5 hash of the entire
attachment.
EMT runs an analysis on each attachment in the database to calculate a
number of metrics. These include, birth rate, lifespan, incident rate, prevalence,
threat, spread, and death rate. They are explained fully in 1, and are displayed
graphically in Figure 3.
Rules speciﬁed by a security analyst using the alert logic section of EMT are
evaluated over the attachment metrics to issue alerts to the analyst. This analysis
may be done to archived email logs by EMT oﬄine, or at runtime in MET while
sniﬃng real-time email ﬂows. The initial version of MET provides the means of
specifying alerts in rule form as a collection of Boolean expressions applied to
thresholds compared to each of the calculated statistics. As an example, a basic
rule might check for each attachment seen if its birth rate is greater than some
speciﬁed threshold AND sent from at least users. The ﬂow statistics of each
1 A paper entitled ”A Behavior-based Approach to Securing Email Systems” has been
prepared for submission to a technical conference and is under review. That paper
describes the use of EMT for virus and spam detection. There is a minor overlap
with that paper in presentation material of some of EMT’s features described herein.
Fig. 2. Overview of data mining based detection system.
email attachment are computed by EMT, as well as the list of speciﬁc emails the
attachment appears in, to identify recipients of those attachments. The primary
detection task MET was designed for includes virus propagation and mitigation.
Intelligence applications of this particular feature would include infosec security
policy violations, and general evidence gathering in forensic analyses.
2.2 Email Content and Classification
Figure 4 illustrates EMT’s main messages tab that provides an analyst with
the means to inspect, cluster and sort email messages under analysis. Emails
can be selected for review and analysis on the basis of time, sender or recipi-
ent account. This data may be labeled directly by an analyst for further data
mining analysis supported by other feature tabs in EMT. Interestingly, EMT
also provides the means of classifying attachments by way of the fully embed-
ded EMF system, a supervised machine learning feature. In the earliest work
on MEF (Malicious Email Filter [?]), the Na¨ıve Bayes classiﬁer was computed
over user selected training sets of attachments. The features extracted include
”n-grams” and their frequencies, extracted and computed directly from the at-
tachment irrespective of its mime type. Hence, in addition to using ﬂow statistics
and attachment classiﬁcations to classify an email message, EMT uses the email
body as a content-based feature. The two features supported are n-gram [?]
modeling and a calculation of the frequency of a set of words [?] from the body
of the email.
An n-gram represents the sequence of any n adjacent characters or tokens
that appear in a document. An n-character wide window is passed over the entire
email body, one character at a time, and a count is computed on the number of
occurrences of each n-gram. This results in a hash table that uses the n-gram as
a key and the number of occurrences as the value for each email; this we refer
to as the document vector.
Given a set of training emails, the arithmetic average of the document vec-
tors can be computed as the centroid for the set. Given an instance of an email,
we compute the cosine distance [?] against the centroid created during training.
If the cosine distance is equal to 1, then the two documents are deemed iden-
tical. The smaller the value of the cosine distance, the more diﬀerent the two
documents are. These content-based methods are integrated into the machine
learning models for classifying sets of emails for further inspection and analysis.
An analyst therefore has the means of honing in on a set of potentially relevant
emails by ﬁrst classifying and clustering sets of emails using the EMT GUI.
Using a set of normal email and spam we collected, we did some initial
experiments over our own email sets to test the eﬃcacy of the approach. We
used half of the labeled emails, both normal and spams, as training data, and
used the other half as the test set. The accuracy of the classiﬁcation using n-
grams and word tokens varies from 70% to 94% when using diﬀerent parts as
training and testing sets.
In the spam classiﬁcation experiment, we noticed some spam emails did not
vary much from normal emails. For example a spam that would be a single link to
a non-threatening website. To improve accuracy we also used weighted key-words
and removal of stop-words. For example, the spam email set noticeably contain
the words: free, money, big, lose weight, etc in a much higher frequency than
regular emails. Users can empirically assign stop-words and keywords and give
higher weight to their frequency count. We continue to evaluate these content
based approaches further; experiments and analysis are ongoing.
2.3 Account Statistics and Alerts
This mechanism has been extended to provide alerts based upon deviation from
other baseline user and group models. EMT computes and displays three tables
of statistical information for any selected email account. The ﬁrst is a set of
stationary email account models, i.e. statistical data represented as a histogram
of the average number of messages sent over all days of the week, divided into
three periods: day, evening, and night. EMT also gathers information on the
average size of messages for these time periods, and the average number of
recipients and attachments for these periods. These statistics can generate alerts
when values are above a set threshold as speciﬁed by the rule-based alert logic
section of EMT.
Stationary User Profiles - Histograms over discrete time intervals His-
tograms are used to model the stationary behavior of a user’s email account.
Figure 8 displays an example for one particular user account. Histograms are
compared to ﬁnd similar behavior or abnormal behavior between diﬀerent ac-
counts, and within the same account (between a long-term proﬁle histogram,
and a recent, short-term histogram).
A histogram depicts the distribution of items in a given sample. EMT employs
a histogram of 24 bins, for the 24 hours in a day. Email statistics are allocated
to diﬀerent bins according to their outbound time. The value of each bin can
represent the daily average number of emails sent out in that hour, or daily
average total size of attachments sent out in that hour, or other features deﬁned
over an of email account computed for some speciﬁed period of time.
Two histogram comparison functions are implemented in the current version
of EMT, each providing a user selectable distance function. The ﬁrst comparison
function is used to identify groups of email accounts that have similar usage
behavior. The other function is used to compare behavior of an account’s recent
behavior to the long term proﬁle of that account. The histogram comparison
functions also may be run ”unanchored”, meaning, the histograms are shifted to
ﬁnd the best alignment with minimum distance; thus accounting for time zone
changes.
Similar Users - Histogram distance Similar behaving user accounts may
be identiﬁed by computing the pair-wise distances of their histograms (eg., a
set of accounts may be inferred as similar to given known or suspect account
that serves as a model). The histogram distance functions were modiﬁed for this
detection task. First, we balance and weigh the information in the histogram
representing hourly behavior with the information provided by the histogram
representing behavior over diﬀerent aggregate periods of a day. This is done
since measures of hourly behavior may be too low a level of resolution to ﬁnd
proper groupings of similar accounts. For example, an account that sends most
of its email between 9am and 10am should be considered similar to another that
sends emails between 10am and 11am, but perhaps not to an account that emails
at 5pm. Given two histograms representing a heavy 9am user, and another for a
heavy 10am user, a straightforward application of any of the histogram distance
functions will produce erroneous results.
Thus, we divide a day into four periods: morning (7am-1pm), afternoon (1pm-
7pm), night (7pm-1am), and late night (1am-7am). The ﬁnal distance computed
is the average of the distance of the 24-hour histogram and that of the 4-bin
histogram, which is obtained by regrouping the bins in the 24-hour histogram.
Second, because some of the distance functions require normalizing the his-
tograms before computing the distance function, we also take into account the
volume of emails. Even with the exact distribution after normalization, a bin
representing 20 emails per day should be considered quite diﬀerent from an ac-
count exhibiting the emission of 200 emails per day. Figure 6 graphically displays
the EMT analysis showing the target user account and a list of the most similar
accounts found by EMT’s histogram analysis.
Abnormal User Account Behavior EMT may apply these distance functions
to one target email account. (See Figures 6.) A long term proﬁle period is ﬁrst
selected by an analyst as the ”normal” behavior period. The histogram computed
for this period is then compared to another histogram computed for a more recent
period of email behavior. If the histograms are very diﬀerent (i.e., they have a
high distance), an alert is generated indicating possible account misuse. We use
the weighted Mahalanobis distance function for these proﬁles.
The long term proﬁle period is used as the training set, for example, a single
month. We assume the bins in the histogram are random variables that are sta-
tistically independent. When the distance between the histogram of the selected
recent period and that of the longer term proﬁle is larger than a threshold, an
alert will be generated to warn the analyst that the behavior ”might be ab-
normal” or is deemed ”abnormal”. The alert is also put into the alert log of
EMT.
The histograms described here are stationary models; they represent statistics
at discrete time frames. Other non-stationary account proﬁles are provided by
EMT, as described next.
Non-Stationary User Profiles - Histograms over blocks of emails An-
other type of modeling considers the changing conditions over time of an email
account. Most email accounts follow certain trends, which can be modeled by
some underlying distribution. As an example of what this means, many people
will typically email a few addresses very frequently, while emailing many others
infrequently. Day to day interaction with a limited number of peers usually re-
sults in some predeﬁned groups of emails being sent. Other contacts with whom
the email account owner interacts with on less than a day to day basis have a
more infrequent email exchange behavior.
The recipient frequency is used as a feature to study this concept of underly-
ing distributions. Four behavior analysis graphs for any selected e-mail account
are created by EMT for this model. These graphs display the address list size
and average outgoing e-mail account spread over time, as well as the number of
outgoing e-mails to each destination account.
Every user of an email system develops a unique pattern of email emission
to a speciﬁc list of recipients, each having their own frequency. Modeling every
user’s idiosyncrasies enables the EMT system to detect malicious or anomalous
activity in the account. This is similar to what happens in credit card fraud
detection, where current behavior violates some past behavior patterns. Figures
5 provides a screenshot of the non-stationary model features in EMT, that are
fully described elsewhere.
In a nutshell, The Proﬁle tab in Figure 5 provides a snapshot of the ac-
count’s activity in terms of recipient frequency. It contains three charts and one
table. The various proﬁle statistics selected by the analyst specify an empirical
distribution that may then be compared by the analyst with a set of built-in
metrics including Chi-square, and Hellinger distance [?]. Rapid changes in email
emissions among accounts can then be discerned which may have particular
intelligence value.
2.4 Group Communication Models: Cliques
In order to study the email ﬂows between groups of users, EMT provides a
feature that computes the set of cliques in an email archive.
We seek to identify clusters or groups of related email accounts that fre-
quently communicate with each other, and then use this information to identify
unusual email behavior that violates typical group behavior, or identify similar
behaviors among diﬀerent user accounts on the basis of group communication
activities.
Clique violations may also indicate internal email security policy violations.
For example, members of the legal department of a company might be expected
to exchange many Word attachments containing patent applications. It would be
highly unusual if members of the marketing department, and HR services would
likewise receive these attachments. EMT can infer the composition of related
groups by analyzing normal email ﬂows and computing cliques (see Figure 7),
and use the learned cliques to alert when emails violate clique behavior. An
analyst may simply wish to compute these cliques and rank order all associated
emails of the clique members for direct inspection.
EMT provides the clique ﬁnding algorithm using the branch and bound al-
gorithm described in [?]. We treat an email account as a node, and establish
an edge between two nodes if the number of emails exchanged between them is
greater than a user deﬁned threshold, which is taken as a parameter (Figure 7 is
displayed with a setting of 100). The cliques found are the fully connected sub-
graphs. For every clique, EMT computes the most frequently occurring words
appearing in the subject of the emails in question which often reveals the clique’s
typical subject matter under discussion.
Chi Square + cliques The Chi Square + cliques (CS + cliques) feature in
EMT is the same as the Proﬁle window described above in 2.3.4, with the addi-
tion of the calculation of clique frequencies.
In summary, the clique algorithm is based on graph theory. It ﬁnds the largest
cliques (group of users), which are fully connected with a minimum number of
emails per connection at least equal to the threshold (set at 50 by default). In
this window, each clique is treated as if it were a single recipient, so that each
clique has a frequency associated with it. Only the cliques to which the selected
user belongs will be displayed. Some users don’t belong to any clique, and for
those, this window is identical to the normal Chi Square window.
If the selected user belongs to one or more cliques, each clique appears under
the name cliquei i:=1,2. . . and is displayed in a cell with a green color in order
to be distinguishable from individual email account recipients. (One can double
click on each clique’s green cell, and a window pops-up with the list of the
members of the clique.)
Cliques tend to have high ranks in the frequency table, as the number of
emails corresponding to cliques is the aggregate total for a few recipients. These
metrics are a ﬁrst step to model user’s behavior in terms of group email emis-
sion frequency. A larger database will enable us to reﬁne them, and to better
understand the time-continuous stochastic process taking place. The Chi square
test may be modiﬁed or completed with ﬁner measures.
The Chi Square tests if the frequencies of emission are constant for a given
user. In the preliminary results that we ran on our collected database, the Chi
Square test has tended to reject quite often the hypothesis that the frequencies
were the same between training and testing periods, indicating that the frequen-
cies are not stable. They change quite dynamically under short time frames,
as new recipients and cliques become more or less popular over time. Any new
model should take into account this dynamic evolution.
Enclave cliques v.s. User cliques Conceptually, two types of cliques can be
formulated and both are supported by EMT. The one described in the previous
section can be called enclave cliques because these cliques are inferred by looking
at email exchange patterns of an enclave of accounts. In this regard, no account
is treated special and we are interested in email ﬂow pattern on the enclave-
level. Any ﬂow violation or a new ﬂow pattern pertains to the entire enclave. On
the other hand, it is possible to look at email traﬃc patterns from a diﬀerent
viewpoint altogether. Consider we are focusing on a speciﬁc account and we have
access to its outbound traﬃc log. As an email can have multiple recipients, these
recipients can be viewed as a clique associated with this account. Since a clique
could be subsumed by another clique, we deﬁned a user clique as one that is not
a subset of any other cliques. In other words, user cliques of an account are its
recipient lists that are not subsets of other recipient lists.
User clique computation provides an intelligence analyst with the means of
quickly identifying groups directly associated with a target email account, and
may be used to group emails for inspection based upon various clique analyses.
This is an active area of our ongoing research. Preliminary experiments have been
performed using these graph theoretic features for spam and virus detection. In
both cases, the clique models provide interesting new evidence to improve the
accuracy of detection beyond what is achievable with pure content-based features
of emails.
3 Conclusion
It is important to note that testing EMT and MET in a laboratory environ-
ment is not particularly informative of its performance on speciﬁc tasks and
source material. The behavior models are naturally speciﬁc to a site or par-
ticular account(s) and thus performance will vary depending upon the quality
of data available for modeling, and the parameter settings and thresholds em-
ployed. EMT is designed to be as ﬂexible as possible so an analyst can eﬀectively
explore the space of models and parameters appropriate for their mission. An
analyst simply has to take it for a test spin. (EMT has been deployed and is
being tested and evaluated by external organizations.)
One of the core principles behind EMT’s design may be stated succinctly:
there is no single monolithic model appropriate for any detection or forensic
analysis task. Hence, EMT provides a pallet of models and proﬁling techniques
(specialized to email log ﬁles) that may be combined in interesting ways by an
analyst to meet their own mission objectives. It is also important to recognize
that no single modeling technique in EMT’s repertoire can be guaranteed to
have no false negatives, or few false positives. Rather, EMT is designed to assist
an analyst or security staﬀ member architect a set of models whose outcomes
provide evidence for some particular detection task. The combination of this
evidence is speciﬁed in the alert logic section as simple Boolean combinations of
model outputs; and the overall detection rates will clearly be adjusted and vary
depending upon the user supplied speciﬁcations of threshold logic.
The Email Mining Toolkit is a work in progress. This paper has described the
core concepts underlying EMT, and its related Malicious Email Tracking system,
and the Malicious Email Filtering system. We have presented the features of the
system currently implemented and available to a analyst for various security
and intelligence applications. The GUI allows the user to easily automate many
complex analyses. We believe the various behavior-based proﬁles computed by
EMT will signiﬁcantly improve analyst productivity. We are continuing our re-
search to broaden the range of features and models one may compute over email
logs. For example, the notion of clique may be over-constrained, and may be
relaxed in favor of other kinds of models of communication groups. Further,
we are actively exploring stochastic models of long-term user proﬁles, with the
aim to compute these models eﬃciently when training such proﬁles. Histograms
computed in ﬁxed time periods is very eﬃcient, but likely insuﬃcient to model
a user’s true dynamic behavior.
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